In its judgment of 8 September 2026 in Case C-298/23, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified that freedom of expression, including political expression and parody, may constitute due cause justifying the unauthorised use of another party’s well-known trademark. This requires a case-specific balancing exercise, for which the Court has identified the relevant criteria.
In November 2022, the Flemish political party Vlaams Belang presented a political programme entitled “IKEA-PLAN, Immigratie Kan Echt Anders”, accompanied by graphics reproducing the typography, colours and characters featured in the assembly instructions of the Swedish furniture retailer.
Inter IKEA Systems subsequently brought trademark infringement proceedings against Vrijheidsfonds, the non-profit association responsible for the campaign. The association admitted that it had used the trademark without authorisation but argued that political freedom of expression constituted due cause for such use. The Brussels Enterprise Court therefore referred a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on whether, and under what conditions, freedom of expression may justify the use of a well-known trademark.
The Court frames the conflict by reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, under which the protection of intellectual property is enshrined in Article 17(2), while freedom of expression is guaranteed by Article 11.
Referring to its previous case law adopting a broad interpretation of due cause and to the importance accorded to freedom of expression in the recitals of trademark legislation, the CJEU held that freedom of expression may, in principle, constitute due cause within the meaning of Article 9(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 and Article 10(2)(c) of Directive (EU) 2015/2436.
However, merely invoking freedom of expression is not sufficient to justify the unauthorised use of a trademark, as this would deprive the concept of due cause of any substantive meaning. A third party seeking to rely on freedom of expression must therefore explain the specific reasons for using another party’s trademark and demonstrate why freedom of expression should prevail.
The first criterion identified by the Court concerns the intention behind the use. Such use must be dictated by the need to exercise freedom of expression in good faith, rather than by a desire to take unfair advantage of the reputation of another party’s trademark or to cause detriment to it. This requirement is particularly relevant where the message concerns the trademark itself, its proprietor, its commercial practices or its products; contributes to a debate of general interest; or where the sign has acquired an independent linguistic meaning or become a shared cultural reference.
The second criterion concerns the contribution made to a debate of general interest. In this context, as the European Court of Human Rights’ case law cited in the judgment confirms, the scope for restrictions is particularly limited, especially in relation to satire and parody.
The third criterion concerns the consequences for the trademark proprietor. These include the intensity, scope and manner of use; the degree of reputation enjoyed by the trademark; the similarity between the signs; and the risk that the public may perceive the proprietor as endorsing the political message, particularly where the proprietor asserts its neutrality, as in the present case.
Where use is made outside the course of trade, as governed by Article 10(6) of the Directive, the outcome of the balancing exercise may differ, since non-commercial expression benefits from broader protection.
Applying these criteria, the Court observed that IKEA is an acronym with no semantic meaning, which has not entered common parlance, and that the political debate addressed by the campaign, although a matter of general interest, had no connection with the trademarks.
The repeated use of signs that are almost identical to those of the trademark proprietor, disseminated widely online, may cause significant detriment to the reputation of the trademark. Accordingly, such use does not appear to outweigh the proprietor’s interests, subject to the assessment of the specific circumstances by the Belgian court hearing the substantive proceedings.
The judgment therefore establishes that, where a third party intends to convey a political or satirical message by using another party’s signs, it must demonstrate that the reference to the well-known trademark has a genuine connection with the message being conveyed and does not amount merely to an unfair attempt to exploit the reputation of the sign.